Ambrose

English

And he distinguished between the light and the darkness; and God saw the light, that it was good (Gen 1:4). He spoke, and no one heard the sound of a voice; he distinguished, and no one caught the labour of the working; he saw, and no one beheld the straining of his eyes. And God saw, it says, the light, that it was good. He did not see what he did not know; nor did he approve what he had not known before, or had not seen: but it is the property of good works that they need no one else to commend them, but attest their own grace when they are seen. What is proved by the sight is more than what is praised by speech. For it uses its own testimony, not another's suffrage. And if among us judgement is issued through the eyes, by which both the grace of beauty and the measure of things is grasped at once, how much more does God see all that he approves, and approve what he sees, according to what is written: The eyes of the Lord are upon the just (Ps 34:16 [Vg 33:16])? Such is the nature of light, that its grace lies not in number, not in measure, not in weight, as other things do, but wholly in the beholding. In its own words, then, he expressed the nature of light, which pleases by being seen, since it is light itself that supplies the office of seeing. Nor was it without cause that it could find so great a herald, by whom it is rightly praised first, since it is light that made the other members of the world worthy of praise too. God therefore saw the light, and lit it with his own face, and saw that it was good. This is not a judgement on God's part, but a general one. And so the grace of light is proved not only in its splendour but in its whole usefulness. And hence the distinction is made between the light and the darkness, so that, the nature of light and of darkness being separated, nothing may be seen to have anything confused within it.

Fresh draft (Claude), approved by Wilson Pruitt · cc-by

Latin

PL 14, col. 142C · pd

Notes

The one witness on either bench who takes 'and God saw that it was good' as a statement about the nature of light rather than about the nature of God's knowledge. Ambrose's problem is not how God can be said to see; he disposes of that in a clause — he did not see what he did not know. His interest is that light is the one thing whose whole grace is in the beholding, so that it is the only creature that could have been praised first, and that a good work needs no external commender but attests itself when it is seen. Only then does he reach the division, and it comes out in a single purpose clause: so that nothing may be seen to have anything confused within it. That is Rashi's plain sense at Gen 1:4 — that it was not seemly that light and darkness should function in confusion — in Milan, and neither could have known the other.

Threads

• ← parallel · Hugh of St Victor
  The same difficulty and two refusals to let it become a problem about God's knowledge. Ambrose: 'he did not see what he did not know; nor did he approve what he had not known before' — the seeing is the self-attestation of a good work. Hugh takes the question seriously and answers it with a second light: in the unchangeable light he saw that this changeable light was good in its own mode and order.
• ← parallel · Abraham ibn Ezra
  The seeing removed from the world in two ways. Ibn Ezra: 'and he saw' is like Qohelet's 'I myself saw' — it is in the thought, so no act is reported. Ambrose: God did not see what he did not know, and the seeing is the good work attesting itself. Both refuse to let the verse describe an inspection, and neither has to posit anything to do it, which is what separates them from Hugh's second light.
• ← parallel · Rashi
  Phase 4. The same purpose clause in Troyes and in Milan, seven hundred years apart. Rashi: it was not seemly that light and darkness should function together in a confused manner. Ambrose: the distinction is made between the light and the darkness so that, their natures being separated, nothing may be seen to have anything confused within it. Neither could have known the other, and it is the closest verbal agreement between the benches on this crux.
• → echoes · Philo of Alexandria
  Ambrose's Hexaemeron follows Basil's, and Basil's follows Philo's, and neither of the two Christians says so. Ambrose: nothing may be seen to have anything confused within it. Philo: had not borders been set fast between them, being neighbours they would have wrought confusion. Ambrose has the conclusion and the word; Philo has the reason, which is that light and darkness are natural enemies contending for mastery. The direction of this edge is the direction of the transmission, from the later text back to the source it does not name, and it is the same shape as Bede copying Basil's Latin at Jarrow and removing the Jews from it.